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Constitutional Politics and Religious Accommodation: Lessons from Spain 
 
Abstract: This article sketches the struggles over and the shifting role of Catholicism in the Spanish 
body politic.  It begins by providing a brief overview of the deep historical ties between Catholicism 
and Spanish identity.  It continues by recounting the dialectical process through which a serious social 
cleavage on the role of religion in politics emerged and percolated over the course of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  This cleavage ultimately pit a militant and reactionary brand of 
authoritarian Catholicism on the right against an equally militant group of secularist ideologues 
associated with both bourgeois-republican and revolutionary working class (mainly anarchist) 
political forces.  Following Juan Linz, the article emphasizes the nefarious role played by constitution-
makers who pursued a partisan secularizing agenda on questions of Church and state in the 
breakdown of democracy and tragic onset of Civil War.  It then delineates the ideology and 
institutionalization of “national-Catholicism” under Franco, before turning to contrast republican-era 
constitution-making dynamics with those of the transition to democracy following Franco’s death.  It 
concludes with a discussion of the content of post-transition conflicts over religion and politics, 
highlighting the constitutional resources for coping with the somehow new yet very old challenge 
posed by the presence of Islam.  
  
Introduction 
This article gives an account of the struggles over and the shifting role of Catholicism in the Spanish 
body politic.  It is intended as a contribution to the comparative literature on religion and politics, 
with special relevance for debates on secularism, constitutional politics, and democracy.   
The case of Spain provides an important corrective to the simplistic but still influential “grand 
narrative involving secularism in the spread of modernization and in the historical path of Euro-
American progress.”1  More specifically, it demonstrates both how difficult and how important is the 
task of constructing “twin tolerations” between secular and religious institutions and authorities.2  
The article begins with an overview of the deep historical ties between Catholicism and Spanish 
identity.  It continues by recounting the dialectical process through which a serious social cleavage 
on the role of religion in politics emerged and percolated over the course of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  This cleavage ultimately pit a militant and reactionary brand of 
authoritarian Catholicism on the right against an equally militant group of secularist ideologues 
associated with both bourgeois-republican and revolutionary working class (mainly anarchist) 
political forces.  In tracing the evolution of this ideological conflict, the article contributes to the 
comparative literature that seeks to understand and endogenize “state policies towards religion [as] 
the result of ideological struggles.”3     
Recent scholarship has begun to re-evaluate the once “axiomatic” assumption “that modernization 
inevitably leads to … secularization.”  In the process, it has begun to recognize that “religion can 
sometimes play” a positive, even “fundamental role in issues of political representation and 
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legitimacy.”4  Yet less emphasis has been placed on the negative role that can be played by militant 
secularizing ideologues and ideologies in contributing to political polarization and to democratic 
instability.   
The Second Republic in Spain (1931-1936) provides a very clear example of such a scenario.  
Following Juan Linz, this article emphasizes the nefarious role played by constitution-makers who 
pursued a partisan secularizing agenda on questions of Church and state.  The separation of Church 
and State entrenched in the 1931 republican constitution ranks alongside that of the 1905 French 
Constitution – which it explicitly emulated – as one of the two most “hostile” such separations in the 
history of Western Europe.5  This hostile separation contributed directly to political polarization, the 
breakdown of democracy, and the tragic onset of Civil War.  
In highlighting the role of republican law-makers in the process of clerical-anticlerical polarization, 
the article converges with the warning issued by more prudent voices in the recent comparative 
literature on religion and politics about how “legal processes and institutions” can produce “a 
hardening of boundaries and a sharpening of antagonisms,” indeed, about how law can participate 
in “the intensification of religious conflict.”6  
In honing in on the militant secularism of republican law-makers in the constitution-making process 
more specifically, the article provides a negative example that serves to buttress recent emphasis in 
the literature on transitions to democracy and on constitutional design on the importance of 
“inclusive representation” and “broadly acceptable outcomes” for the success of constitution-
making processes.7  This is a more general lesson, but one with particular relevance for questions of 
religious accommodation in democratizing societies with potential for deep sectarian divisions.8  The 
article thus simultaneously contributes to another recent turn in comparative politics and to recent 
demands to pay closer attention to the process of constitution-making and to “constitutional 
moments.”9   
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After recounting the tragic denouement of the Republican period, the article proceeds to delineate 
the ideology and institutionalization of “national-Catholicism” under Franco, before turning to 
contrast republican-era constitution-making dynamics with those of the transition to democracy 
following Franco’s death.   
The post-transition constitutional order can be usefully described as embodying a “positive 
accommodation” of Catholicism and a “friendly separation” between Church and State.10  This 
friendly separation was facilitated as much by the demise of authoritarian Catholicism on the right as 
it was the disappearance of militant secularism on the left.    
Contemporary Spain’s “positive accommodation” of Catholicism situates the country squarely within 
the norm among the twenty-seven European Union democracies – 89% of which “have religious 
education in state schools as a standard offering,” 44% of which “fund the clergy,” rendering it more 
secular than the 19% of which “have established religion.”11  
The article concludes with a discussion of the content of post-transition conflicts over religion and 
politics.  It stresses that old debates about religion and secularism have become increasingly 
interwoven with new “questions about the scope and limits of a multicultural and multi-ethnic 
society,” as they have across much of Europe.12  It highlights both the constitutional resources as 
well as ideological obstacles for coping with the somehow new yet very old challenge posed by the 
presence of Islam in Spain. 
 
Spanish Identity and Spanish Catholicism 
 
The question of the role of religion in politics has a profound and conflictual history in Spain, an 
Empire cum nation-state whose identity has long been intimately linked with Catholicism.  Not unlike 
British identity in relation to Protestantism, where, as Linda Colley has argued, “[m]ore than 
anything else, it was [a] shared religious allegiance combined with recurrent wars that permitted a 
sense of British national identity to emerge.”  According to Colley, Protestantism not only “coloured 
the way that Britons approached and interpreted their material life”; it also long “determined how 
Britons viewed their politics” and indeed provided “the foundation on which their state was 
explicitly and unapologetically based.”13   
This shared religious basis for identification with the “body politic” was forged in Britain over the 
course of recurrent wars against a particular enemy,” “other,” and projected foil, against which the 
alleged virtues of Protestant Britons were imagined to stand out in stark relief.  The role was 
originally played by Catholic states and by Catholic subjects.  The latter were rendered strangers, 
stigmatised, excluded and oppressed as suspicious, as a potential “fifth column.”  In Colley’s words, 
there existed “a vast superstructure of prejudice throughout eighteenth-century Britain, a way of 
seeing (or rather mis-seeing) Catholics and Catholic states,” which originally emerged out of the 
Reformation and “was fostered by successive wars with France and Spain,” and which in turn relied 
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upon and reinforced a sense of collective superiority, “encourag[ing] many Britons, irrespective of 
their real income, to regard themselves as peculiarly fortunate.”14 
In a similar vein, historians of Spain have long insisted upon the Catholic basis of Spanish identity.  
Writing in 1966, Oxford Don Raymond Carr would argue in his magisterial overview of “modern” 
Spain that the influence of the Catholic Church “depended upon its penetration at every level of 
social life,” and that “Catholicism was, and is, not merely a personal faith but the formal sign of 
belonging to Spanish society.”15   
 
That same year, the renowned Spanish historian Ramón Menéndez Pidal, touted at the time by his 
English-language publishers at Norton as “the great patriarch of humanism in the Spanish world,” 
would insist in The Spaniards in their History upon the centrality of the struggle against Islam in the 
forging of Spanish identity, over the course of the so-called Reconquista (or “Reconquest”).  
According to Menéndez Pidal, in the centuries following the “Moslem invasion,” rather than “feeling 
themselves estranged from the rest” of the Iberian peninsula “which was solidly Islamized,” and in 
stark contrast to “other Ancient provinces of the Roman Empire … which had fallen prey to the 
Moslems,” the “northern kingdoms” of the Iberian peninsula reacted. These “northern kingdoms” 
were united around a commitment to a “religious ideal as well as with patriotic resolve.”16  Indeed, 
they allegedly displayed a “pure unfettered religious spirit,” managing to “fus[e] into one single ideal 
the recovery of the Gothic states of the fatherland and the redemption of the enslaved churches for 
the glory of Christianity.”17     
 
Spanish identity was, thus, a unity first forged around commitment to a religious cause, in the course 
of a centuries-long struggle against an enemy, an “other,” a foil.  The virtues of the Spanish 
reconquistadores were long portrayed and imagined to stand out in relief against the projected vices 
of an Islamic foe.  These imaginings still matter today.  For as Marx so eloquently and rightly insisted, 
“[t]he traditions of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”18  
 
Menéndez Pidal proceeds to explain that the “zenith” of “the Spanish religious spirit” would be 
reached “in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” – which witnessed a “magnificent outburst of 
enthusiasm” for the Counter-Reformation, for which Spain allegedly “devoted her entire life and 
energies to urging on Europe the Catholic movement of reconstruction.”  According to Menéndez 
Pidal, in the wake of the Renaissance, which “strengthened the spirit of nationality in the modern 
states” and thereby “caused each of them to look exclusively to their own interests without any 
consideration for the spirit of Catholic unity upheld by the Middle Ages but now cracking and 
splitting asunder,” only Spain stayed true to “its inveterate mediaeval purpose.”  Spain was the only 
Kingdom that continued to identify its own “aims with the universal aims of Christianity.”19       
Menéndez Pidal’s account is, of course, both illuminating and contentious.  It is contentious insofar 
as he speaks of “Spain’s aims” or “its commitments.” To do so is to engage in a highly questionable 
anthropomorphism, and an even more questionable anachronism.   
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It is certainly a distinctive characteristic of the Spanish legacy, perhaps even decisive in determining 
its part in “early Modern” European history, the success of the Counterreformation among the 
nobility and the clerics in the lands controlled by the Spanish Crown.   
But to speak of Spain’s “aims” and its “commitments,” much less “its religious spirit” or especially its 
“patriotic resolve” is an anthropomorphism reflective of a nationalist imaginary.  It is to impute a 
single and conscious will corresponding to the collective Spanish “body politic.”  It is to mistake an 
accurate depiction of ruling class ethos for a manifestation of a general will.  This despite the 
absence from the historical record of the voices of the vast majority of disenfranchised inhabitants 
of the lands under the feudal jurisdictions of the legal entity that has come to be called Spain.    
Moreover, it is an anachronism even to refer to those feudal jurisdictions as “Spain,” since the 
territories under the control of the Crown and at the vanguard of the Counter-Reformation also 
included the lands of the Austrian Habsburgs, Portugal, and Italy as well, not to mention the 
“Spanish” colonies in ultramar.20 
Nevertheless, the historical record is definitely replete with evidence of a good dose of “religious 
zeal,” at least in terms of legitimating rhetoric and artistic manifestations, amongst the ruling class 
and those organically linked to the Courts of the Habsburg Monarchy over the course of the 
Counter-Reformation.  Menéndez Pidal proudly refers in this regard to the prominent role played 
especially during the so-called “Golden Age” by a “ruling minority of the highest worth.”  These 
included not only “theologians who were able to intervene decisively in the Council of Trent and 
serve as leaders of learning in the European universities;” but also “mystical writers, ascetics and 
scripturists who were of the greatest produced by any country,” as well as “poets who succeeded in 
interesting the whole people in the deepest problems of grace and free-will, in the most recondite 
questions of scholasticism as well as in the most subtle allegories of religious history.”21   
Menéndez Pidal does not emphasis some of the less admirable features of this “religious zeal,” such 
as the early expulsion by the so-called “Catholic Kings” of the Jews, the subsequent forced 
conversions and cleansing of the remains of Islamic presence, followed by the religious-cum-racist 
promulgation of “blood purity” statutes that equated ancestry “uncontaminated by Muslim or 
Jewish blood” as proof of “orthodoxy” and “personal honor.”22   
Indeed, the Holy Office of the Inquisition, approved by the pope and created under the auspices of 
the “Catholic Kings” in 1482, had as its primary task “to make certain that conversos had sincerely 
converted to Catholicism and were not continuing to practice the Jewish faith behind closed doors.”  
First Jews then Moors were forced to convert or be cleansed.  Moreover, “[a]dherence to strict 
religious orthodoxy and isolation from ‘foreign’ influences was reinforced during the reign of Felipe 
II.”  And “in 1609 Felipe III, out of fear the [Christianized] moriscos might undermine at home Spain’s 
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military campaigns against Islamic Turks abroad, initiated a massive expulsion of more than a 
quarter million moriscos.”23  
In sum, the persecution of all signs and suspicions of religious dissidence, the eradication and 
extirpation of religious diversity, across a peninsula previously characterized by religious mix and 
hybridity.  The “religious zeal” of the ruling minority was thus marked by a “passion for unity” that 
was simultaneously and stridently exclusionary and exclusivist, willing and even eager to “cleanse.”24   
Nor can it be forgotten that, in addition to and alongside this European plot, overseas colonial 
expansion was undertaken and largely justified in missionary terms.  The recent long overdue 
apology delivered by Pope Francis in the name of the Catholic Church for its complicity in the sins of 
colonial exploitation and oppression, pillaging and plundering, only serves to underscore the 
continuing resonance and even surging consciousness of grievances associated with this sordid 
legacy, especially given the recent rise of indigenista movements across Latin America.   
 
Catholic Beliefs and their Relation to Secular Millenarian Projects 
Though most of the historical record concentrates on and communicates the perspective of the 
“ruling minority” and therefore of official religion, though it is indeed notable that millenarian 
movements prevalent in other parts of Europe largely bypassed Spain during the so-called “Middle 
Ages.”25  
The historian José Álvarez Junco has argued that anarchism, with its notable appeal among peasants 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in many parts of Spain, is best interpreted as a 
secularized, political religion, the ideological content of which reflected and continued a deep 
tradition of commitment to millenarian Catholic beliefs.26  If Álvarez Junco’s most suggestive 
interpretation is correct, the militant atheism expressed in Spanish anarchism would constitute but 
an instance of Nietzschean transvaluation, the very vehemence of the negation revealing a 
continued subjection to perceptual schemas and categories of vision and division built into the 
worldview which is rejected and denied.  
The same can be said for anticlericalism more generally in Spain, which displayed many of the very 
same tendencies towards fanaticism that it so rightly decried in its adversary, Spanish Catholicism.  
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As Gerald Brenan would perspicaciously note in his highly influential account of the Spanish Civil 
War: 
“If the Spanish Church is to be described as fanatical, the same word must equally be applied to 
many of the anti-clericals.  And since fanaticism leads to credulity, on each side there grew up a 
firm belief in the power and the wickedness of the occult forces of their adversaries; in the one 
case of the freemasons and supposed Russian agents and on the other of the monks and the 
Jesuits.  Of all the many antagonisms that during the last forty years have flourished in Spain, 
none was more bitter or envenomed than that between the Catholic Church and its opponents.  




Polarization around the question of the role of religion in politics and society was indeed an 
important factor of instability and violence, contributing to the breakdown of the Second Republic 
and the outbreak of Civil War; moreover, the military uprising was legitimated and justified in 
explicitly religious terms as a Crusade.  However, the intensity of the conflict over relations between 
Church and State in the Republican period and over the course of the war represented but the 
culmination of a long historical process stretching back at least to the late-eighteenth century in 
which, “[r]ather than serving as a unifying force, as it had during the first several centuries following 
the Reconquista,” religious issues had come to constitute a source of deep division and “cleavage” 
even among the ruling minority.28   
 
 
The Origins of the Clerical-Anticlerical Divide 
 
As Juan Linz has stressed, the Imperial decline and concomitant pervasive sense of decadence of 
Spain in the Eighteenth Century, followed by the crisis generated by the French Revolution, the 
Napoleonic invasions, along with the loss of most of the colonies, all contributed to the 
marginalization of Spain in the course of the nineteenth century.  Resistance to Napoleon generated 
simultaneously a liberal minority that aspired to the political and social “modernization” of the 
country, as well as a populist reactionary response most frequently protagonized by rural clerics.  
These two forces would continuously confront one another on successive occasions over the course 
of the century, but neither was strong enough to dominate the other.  Their conflicts gradually gave 
way to a relatively long-lasting compromise between liberals and conservatives in the Restauration 
Monarchy established in 1875.29  Even so, the profound confrontations with anticlerical forces in the 
first half of the century left an indelible mark on the Spanish Church.  Particularly the frontal attacks 
on Church property and on particular religious orders, such as the Jesuits, left “deep scars” and 
pushed the Spanish Church “in an ultra-reactionary direction.”30  
The main successive stages of this long historical conflict between the forces of anticlerical 
“modernization” and the forces of clerical “reaction” have been ably summarized by Linz’s followers, 
Gunther, Montero, and Botella, who trace the “clerical-anticlerical” cleavage in Spanish politics and 
society back to 1773, with the expulsion of the Jesuits by the enlightened absolutist monarch, Carlos 
III.31  The successive stages of the conflict have something of the shape of a pendulum that swings, 
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albeit with sudden spurts and lags in momentum.  The cause of liberalism would initially be further 
advanced after the Napoleonic invasion, when, inspired by Enlightenment ideals, Joseph Bonaparte 
abolished the Inquisition.  Gunther and his collaborators, however, rely on Cazorla’s interpretation 
to argue that Bonaparte’s liberalizing action ultimately “strengthened the forces of reaction,” by 
rendering opposition to liberalism synonymous with “liberation from French Imperialism.”  They 
next turn to refer to Artola’s account of the period subsequent to the restoration of Fernando VII to 
the Spanish throne, which they depict as “a first reactionary period, in which the Inquisition was 
restored, Jesuits returned from exile, all previous reforms were revoked, liberal members of the 
clergy were purged, and persecution of Freemasons began.”32     
 
According to Linz, Fernando VII’s policies set an important precedent for Spanish Catholicism in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, since his “reactionary interpretation of the Restoration relied 
on the most unenlightened elements of the Church, and on a populist sentiment that had identified 
patriotism and religion against the Napoleonic armies.”33  
 
Soon the pendulum would again swing the other way, beginning in 1820, with a “liberal 
pronunciamiento” restoring the 1812 Constitution, abolishing anew the Inquisition, and expelling 
again the Jesuits, as well as “seiz[ing] some church properties, and clos[ing] more than half of Spain’s 
monasteries.”  But action ever leads to reaction, resulting in a “civil war (1822-1823) between 
reactionary and liberal Catholics, which ended with the restoration of Fernando and the initiation of 
an even harsher period of reactionary repression.”34   
 
Gunther and his colleagues continue, this time relying on the account of Tomás y Valiente, that with 
the death of Fernando in 1833 and the accession of Isabel II, the pendulum would swing the other 
way yet again.  Liberalizing governments in Madrid demonstrated “hostility to the church reinforced 
by the civil war against the reactionary Carlists,” and attacked the church with “policies design to 
weaken greatly” its power.  These included not only the expulsion of the Jesuits for a third time, the 
closure of “all convents and monasteries housing fewer than twelve monks,” as well as, most 
importantly, “a radical program of desamortazicación: the confiscation and sale of Church lands.”  
Alongside these legal attacks came the birth of a brand of militant anticlericalism, including episodes 
of anticlerical violence, too.35           
 
There were, of course, solid economic reasons adduced by the liberalizing state in its confiscation of 
Church property.  As Linz suggests, “liberal economic policies … required the mobilization of landed 
property and therefor the sale of the Church mortmain.”  Moreover, the financial problems of the 
state would be compounded by the costs of the Carlist wars, which triggered a “wholesale 
expropriation of the Church and the closing of most convents in the 1830’s.”  However, the 
unintended consequences produced by these attacks would have far-reaching consequences.  Not 
only would the “numbers of the clergy fall drastically before the middle of the century,” but also the 
end of the Church’s largesse would lead to the “destruction of the welfare activities of the Church” – 
activities that had previously “tied the poor to it.”  This, alongside the “recurrent expulsions of the 
Jesuits” and the incipient “persecution of monks by mobs,” weakened the Church considerably, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
32
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33
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significantly narrowing its social base, and therefore ended up “pushing it further into the hands of 
Carlist reaction.”36     
 
Even so, the assent of the right-wing faction of the liberals, the so-called Moderados, brought with it 
a considerable deceleration of the swinging of the pendulum, and thus “a more conciliatory stance … 
reflected in the first Concordat with the Vatican in 1851,” according to which Catholicism was re-
established “as the sole religion of the state,” religious instruction was rendered “obligatory at all 
levels of education,” some religious orders were allowed to return, and church property was 
guaranteed and protected.  For its part, the Church for the first time “acknowledged the right of the 
government to participate in the appointment of church officials,” and accepted the bulk of previous 
property confiscations as consummated and irreversible facts.  Moreover, in exchange for “its 
confiscations of the church’s own sources of income,” the state began to “contribute subsidies to 
church-run educational institutions,” and, crucially, to pay “the wages of the clergy.”37   
 
But the compromise proved incapable of channelling the Church decisively towards a more 
moderate, pragmatic posture towards status quo in Spain, much less the “modern world.”  Despite 
having acquired state subsidies sufficient for survival in the compromise, the legitimation of “the 
acquisition of Church property by the bourgeoisie and the nobility” nevertheless left the Church with 
a bitter taste of “political defeat,” rendering it susceptible to “the most literal interpretations of the 
denunciations” of the “modern world” contained in Pope Pius XI’s 1864 Syllabus of Errors, in which 
the ultraconservative pontiff lashed out against liberalism and secularism.  Despite the attainment of 
significant guarantees in the Concordat, and the Vatican’s seal of approval, “much of the clergy and 
many sincere believers could not accept it,” and an “undercurrent” of militant “anti-modernity” was 
reinforced, whose dialectical counterpart and mirror image was an equally strong undercurrent of 
militant anticlericalism, increasingly spreading out from its initial middle class intellectual core to 
infect much of the working class with hostility towards the decidedly reactionary Church.38       
 
With the abdication of Isabel II in 1868 came a brief new surge of a strengthened anticlerical 
impulse.  In the turmoil surrounding the declaration of the short-lived First Republic, much of the 
Concordat would be revoked, and the Jesuits expelled yet again – for a fourth time – before being 
reinstated, along with the Concordat, under the Restoration Monarchy.39 
 
The 1870’s would witness an important inflection in Spain’s intellectual life, with the emergence for 
the first time of an important trend of secularization, “led by the Spanish followers of the German 
idealist philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause,” who flourished especially during the First 
Republic but whose influence continued long thereafter, managing to put “the Catholic intellectuals 
on the defensive” even within Spain.40 
 
This defensiveness, verging on collective paranoia, evident in the attitudes of the Catholic 
intellectuals in late nineteenth century Spain, especially during interims or pendulum swings of 
liberal assent, should not be underestimated.  As reflected in the thought of conservatives and 
traditionalists alike, their defensiveness was a clear manifestation of a Spanish Catholic mentality 
that found itself besieged by the forces of the “modern world,” responding to a threatened sense of 
worth, doubly imbued with the motivational force of ressentiment.  Into the open wound of Imperial 
decline and the concomitant pervasive sense of decadence and marginalization of their 
contemporary Spain within capitalist Europe, was added the salt of the domestic penetration of 
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“foreign,” secularizing ideals propagated by the most prestigious and well known figures in Spanish 
intellectual life.  Ressentiment induced by the decline of Spain and of Catholicism on the world stage 
of great power politics, combined with ressentiment induced by the failed pursuit of prestige in the 
public sphere and especially University settings, from which theological studies were excluded 
altogether, on the domestic front.  Power-political plus petty-political ressentiment, a most potent 
and explosive combination and reactionary concoction.    
 
Thus the continuing appeal of Carlism, and of its various “traditionalist” splinter groups and 
derivations, its ability to survive and to reactivate and utilize particular perceptual schema on 
multiple occasions, to reconstruct and re-mobilize memories never forgotten amidst the dense 
fabric of myths, symbols and rituals surrounding Carlism, to ever anew reproduce and revive the 
organicist social imaginary reflected in the strident counter-revolutionary hymn, “For God, for 
country, for King fought our fathers.  For God, for country, for King shall we fight, too.”41  The staying 
power of this thoroughly reactionary appeal served to siphon off creative potential away from the 
development of more “pragmatic” or “progressive” forms of Spanish Catholicism, hindering the 
emergence of a moderating, modernizing organizational subculture such as those that emerged via 
the mobilization of lay Catholics by the Church hierarchy in Germany, Belgium, or France.  The 
vacuum of Catholic social organization in turn “reinforced the dependence of the Church hierarchy 
on state support,” contributing to an intensification of “the desire for identification between state 
and religion in the external manifestations of both institutions.”  At the same time, the close 
identification between Church and State partly backfired, frequently reinforcing alienation from 
both, ultimately sealing a high dose of hostility towards the Church among large portions of the 
lower classes.42 
 
The emergence of working class hostility towards the Church would in turn further strengthen the 
anticlerical convictions of the urban middle-class liberal intellectuals.  It is important to stress the 
material bases of this development, underpinning the diffusion of anticlericalism at the level of 
working class consciousness.  As noted above, the confiscation of Church property led to major 
changes in the operation of the Church, which came to rely on state subsidies for survival.  This 
situation of financial dependence upon the upper social strata in control of the state inclined the 
Church to be more supportive of these privileged strata.   
 
Gunther and his collaborators draw the contrast in rather stark terms.  In the eighteenth century, “a 
financially independent church served as an important levelling institution in Spanish society, often 
defending the interests of the poor and performing important educational and social welfare 
functions,” a point on which interpretations as ideologically diverse as the likes of Brenan, Payne, 
Cazorla, or Cuenca Toribio have all concurred.  By contrast, “[w]ith the loss of its lands, and 
therefore its financial independence,” came a clear “decline in the church’s concern with the plight 
of the poor or the broader interests of the working classes.”  This disengagement was quickly 
translated into disaffection and soon ripened into full-fledged hostility among large segments of the 
toiling masses – especially among the most severely dispossessed, the landless agricultural laborers 
in the South of the country, not to mention among the urban working classes as well, particularly in 
Catalonia.43   
 
An onset of successive outbursts or waves of anticlerical violence soon enough ensued, which served 
predictably to exacerbate the fears and paranoia of the privileged and the devout.  The result – a 
polarization of sentiment along an increasingly unidimensional axis in which class and religious 
conflict came to be conceived as inextricably intertwined, a heated ideological climate in which 
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increasing numbers would eventually succumb to the Manichean temptation to glorify and identify 
entirely with one of the “two Spains,” while demonizing the other.     
 
Reactionary, thoroughly “anti-modern” interpretations of Catholicism, on the one side, militant 
anticlericalism among the more liberal sectors of the bourgeoisie and the workers’ movement 
bleeding into even a sort of “anti-religious fundamentalism” amongst the anarchists, on the other, 
had percolated.  Two existential enemies had been conjured into being, each of whose projected 
vices, deep-seated fears and unspoken murderous fantasies, in many ways mirrored the “other,” as 
such Manichean imaginings and constructions nearly always do. 
 
The fall of the Restoration Monarchy in 1923, as a result of the severe social tensions and military 
crisis triggered by the country’s floundering colonial adventurism in Morocco, and the subsequent 
eight-year dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera, led to a certain consolidation of 
extremely high stake, life-or-death existential terms perceived and employed by both sides of the 
“two Spain’s” in struggle.   The close identification of the Church with the dictatorship reinforced and 
ratcheted up hostility to the Church among the enemies of the dictatorship, thereby setting the 
stage for the anticlerical enthusiasm unleashed with the birth of the Second Republic.44    
 
 
Religion and Politics in the Second Republic 
 
Throughout the period of the Second Republic, the fears and hostilities expressed by each side of the 
divide were mutually reinforcing and strikingly similar.  For the anticlerical camp, Manuel Azaña 
most prominent among them, the Catholic religion was portrayed and perceived as the source of 
nearly all of Spain’s woes, looming behind virtually every “impediment and practical obstacle to the 
modernization” of the country, in a word, the “incarnation of anti-modernity.”  Indeed, as we shall 
see, anticlerical ministers such as Azaña spoke passionately, eloquently, and openly about 
Catholicism as a “counter-revolutionary force” that needed to be thoroughly – even violently – 
“uprooted from the consciousness of the masses.”  Likewise, the Catholic right came to see 
Republican secularising policies as manifestations of the “anti-Spain,” working to undermine and 
eradicate the very identity of the Spanish nation, since that identity allegedly could not be separated 
from the Catholic tradition.  In their eyes, the Republican forces were not only “godless” but 
“without a country,” the expression and product of a “foreign cultural invasion.”  As Gunther and his 
colleagues evocatively put it: “modernizing Republicans were called ‘Frenchified’, and the 
revolutionary Republicans were defined as ‘Bolsheviks’.”45    
 
Constitutional politics played a particularly destructive role in the bloody denouement of this 
antagonism.  The democratic opening of the Republican period proved a failure in forging a stable 
third way or middle ground between the two existential foes; instead, moderates and middle-of-the-
roaders were increasingly pulled into the gravitational fields of diametrically-opposed extremes.  But 
this was by no means a forgone conclusion, much less an instance of over-determination.  To the 
contrary, there was plenty of contingency and especially political irresponsibility involved.  Among 
these, Linz has famously emphasized strategic errors committed by the Republican leadership in 
framing the new democratic constitution.  In particular, the substantive political agenda of 
anticlericalism was enshrined in the Republican constitution – and this “created deep resentments 
that mobilized large sectors of the population who had initially felt apathetic or expectant about the 
new regime rather than actively negative.”46  
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According to Linz, the optimal constitutional scenario for facilitating democratic consolidation and 
regime stability is one that manages to incorporate as broad a coalition as possible.  To achieve this 
often elusive end, it is most prudential to abstain from substantively-loading the founding 
constitutional document with controversial partisan-programmatic aims.  Constitutional 
compromise is the best the policy; where impossible, silence or even apocryphal formulations 
compatible with vastly different programmatic interpretations or applications is advisable.  The 
founding Republican coalition pursued neither such strategy with regard to the extremely divisive 
issue of the relations between Church and State.   
 
To the contrary, the birth of the Second Republic “was linked closely with the triumph” of one side 
over the other, specifically, “of anticlericalism over the established Church” – predictably producing 
as a result “a drastic polarization of the religious cleavage.”  As Gunther and his co-authors succinctly 
summarize, “the provisional government of 1931 indicated its anticlerical intentions even before the 
constituent process began.”  Indeed, very soon after the abdication of Alfonso XIII in April, the 
provisional government “issued a series of decrees that in effect abrogated the Concordat of 1851.”  
Not surprisingly, these “provoked a strong reaction from Catholic forces,” crucially including the 
“publication of a pastoral letter by the primate of the Catholic Church praising” the by-then “defunct 
monarchy and urging Catholics to unite in defense of the Church.”  As if impelled towards a spiralling 
dynamic of provocation and reaction, the new Republican authorities responded by expelling the 
primate from the country.  Such official government policies were accompanied by “waves of 
anticlerical violence” which “swept the country in mid-May,” including the burning of convents.47   
These violent acts were perpetrated by small groups, but, as Linz points out, the Republican 
authorities were initially either unable or unwilling to stop them.  This, alongside the provisional 
government’s effort to “secularize the society by decree” produced another counterpoint in the 
spiral of provocation and reaction, mobilizing “a mass Catholic reaction against the new regime.”48  
Throughout the regime’s first few months of existence, the tendency towards intensifying hostility 
and mutual suspicions never ceased to gain momentum. 
 
Nor were the new Republican authorities successful during the constituent period in shoring up 
support amongst those who constituted in some ways the new regime’s “natural” constituency, the 
previously dispossessed workers and peasants.  According to Linz, the “honeymoon of the new 
regime” – “a time that could have been used to promote policies creating a strong basis of support” 
– was virtually wasted.  The Republican leaders were not adept at strengthening the bases of their 
support by setting the agenda in a way that magnified their appeal among their “natural” 
constituency of the lower classes.   Rather than focusing their energies on pressing class issues such 
as agrarian reform, unemployment and underemployment, or the need to improve the financial 
capacity of the state, all of which stood to benefit tangibly the lower classes, the Republican 
coalition spent way too much time during its “honeymoon” wasting its political capital waxing 
eloquent about the urgency of secularization.  It thereby confirmed the worst fears of and infuriated 
a most powerful opponent, without placating the crucial material demands and needs of the lower 
classes or the movements representing them.  In Linz’s memorable formulation: “Once the 
immediate emotional gratification that [anticlerical] policies provided the regime-supporters had 
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passed, they did not bring tangible benefits to the masses, and in fact appeared only as a bourgeois 
diversion from more immediate and pressing social demands.”49 
 
The debates of the Constitutive Assembly are particularly revealing of the prominence and passion 
associated with the issue of Church and state relations.  In his classic account of the demise of the 
Republic and the Civil War, Gabriel Jackson would describe the issue as “[t]he most important 
conflict in the elaboration of the Constitution.”  As the reader will recall, the Concordat of 1851 had 
recognized Roman Catholicism “as the official religion of Spain,” but the provisional government of 
the new Republic had almost immediately “proclaimed religious liberty by decree.”  This 
proclamation would be consolidated and enshrined in the draft for Article 3 of the new Constitution, 
which “declared that the state had no official religion.”  But this was not the crux of the issue.  The 
Church of course vociferously protested against this measure, claiming it constituted a “unilateral 
violation of the Concordat;” but the formal separation of Church and state on its own might well 
have been negotiable.  Indeed, Jackson insists that “a large proportion of Catholics themselves 
favoured it.”  However, the anticlerical measures enshrined in the Constitution went much further 
than the formal separation of Church and state, and “critical dissension arose over the many 
restrictions that were to be placed on all aspects of the Church’s activity.”50 
 
Article 48, which established a single system of public state-run schools, was a matter of particular 
objection, since the Church had long enjoyed a near-monopoly over education.  Meanwhile, the 
debate surrounding Article 26, which “terminated state subsidies to religious organizations and 
threatened religious orders with confiscation of property,” was perhaps the most vehement of all.51  
Jackson refers to it as nothing short of “the first revolutionary conflict in the history of the young 
Republic.”52 
 
The intervention of Manuel Azaña in the debate on the floor of the Constitutive Assembly over 
Article 26 is illustrative of the force of intellectual rejection of Catholic dominance over Spanish 
cultural life, as well as the extent to which such dominance was blamed by anticlerical forces for the 
country’s political and economic secular decline among the ranks of “Great Western” nations.53  In 
his rhetorically powerful speech, Azaña unequivocally identifies as simultaneously Spaniard and 
European in rendering a harsh verdict on the pernicious influence of the Counterreformation as the 
hermeneutic key for understanding Spain’s secular decline. The Black Legend contained a kernel of 
truth after all. The Counterreformation had forged negative and intolerant attitudes towards 
“modern culture” and “modern science.” And so, Spain’s Catholicism was ultimately to be blamed 
for its tragic descent from glory, its post-Imperial decadence, its relative backwardness.  
Nevertheless, there was hope for Spain still, since after all, Azaña would famously declare, “Spain 
has ceased to be Catholic.”54 
 
What could such an affirmation possibly mean?  Azaña insisted that his judgment was objective.  By 
using the very same criteria employed to characterize Spain in the past as Catholic, his argument 
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went, a dispassionate observer of the present would be forced to conclude that the country was no 
longer Catholic.  Azaña readily admitted that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Spain 
was “at the peak of its genius,” when it was “a creative and inventive people, it created a 
Catholicism in its own likeness and image.”  But now, he proclaimed, “the situation is exactly the 
inverse.”  While it is an undeniable fact that “for many centuries, speculative activity and European 
thought took place” within the parameters dictated by the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, 
it is no less true that this has not been the case for centuries.  Indeed, for the past few centuries, 
“thought and speculative activity in Europe have ceased to be Catholic” altogether.   
 
Here Azaña identifies with and draws on a European “civilizational” narrative, indeed wields it most 
effectively though no doubt infuriatingly for devout Spaniards.  He pushes the point further, 
asserting hyperbolically that “all superior movements of civilization” have long been erected not 
only outside of but directly against Catholicism.  Even more painfully for the ears of the devout, he 
would go on to mention, “in Spain, despite our diminished mental activity, Catholicism stopped 
being the expression and guide of Spanish thought last century.”  Indeed, he would highlight, his 
point has nothing to do with the fact that there remain millions of believers in Spain.  This he was 
more than willing to admit, he refused to dispute.  Nevertheless, he would insist, the “ser religioso 
(religious being) of a country, of a people, of a society is not simply the numerical sum of beliefs or 
believers,” but rather, is constituted by “the creative force of its [collective] mind, the direction of its 
culture.”  A provocative and eloquently-put point, no doubt, though disturbingly elitist.   
 
From this quasi-metaphysical point of departure about the “religious being” of the country, its 
inextricable association with the currents of Culture with a capital C (a.k.a. European civilization), 
Azaña would turn to elaborate the principles, constitutional policies, and “organizational form of 
state” he regarded as appropriate “for this new historical phase of the Spanish people.”  As he saw 
it, the constituent assembly had a dual obligation: an “obligation to respect freedom of conscience,” 
one the one side, which nevertheless had to be balanced with the obligation to keep the Republic 
and the State safe, on the other.  Unfortunately, as the high drama and passion surrounding the 
issue reflected, the two principles necessarily come into direct conflict and collide, at least such was 
Azaña’s contention.  The constituent assembly is thus forced to take a side; and the higher obligation 
must be upheld, which for “we, laicos, servants of the State and governing politicians of the 
Republic,” is most certainly “the principle of the health of the State.” 
 
In a word, and in accordance with such a general ordering of principles, when it comes to the rights 
and status of religious orders, the criteria of “social utility and the defense of the Republic” trump.  
Azaña even employs the metaphor of the constituent assembly as a surgeon in this regard – a 
surgeon about to perform an operation on a man without anaesthesia, whose complaints about the 
pain of the operation are complicating things, threatening to render the procedure mortal.  To which 
he would quickly add the warning, perhaps with a hint of malice – “mortal I’m not sure for whom, 
but mortal for someone.”      
 
Moreover, with respect to the crucial issue of the role of religion in schooling, Azaña’s commitment 
to a militant, even exclusionary, secularism would come across unequivocally.  According to Azaña: 
“[I]n no moment, at no time, will either I or my party allow for any legislative clause to continue to 
hand over to the religious orders the service of education.  Just to be clear, he would continue: “I am 
very sorry; but this is the true defense of the Republic.”  Indeed, the power of the religious orders 
over the consciences and consciousness of the youth is the “secret” behind the current state of 
decadence and backwardness in the country; and for this reason, “it is our obligation as Republicans 
– and not just as Republicans, as Spaniards” – to prevent at all costs the perpetuation of such a 
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travesty.  As such, he would forcefully conclude: “Don’t come to me and say that this goes against 
liberty, because this is a question of public health.”55  
 
Juan Linz has elaborated a useful five-fold distinction mapping a universe of possible configurations 
of the relations between Church and State.  Five points can be situated on a spectrum from (1) 
theocracy, to (2) politicized religion, to (3) a friendly separation of Church and State, to (4) an 
unfriendly separation of Church and State, to (5) a secular political religion.56  Given his role as an 
emblematic figure of the Republic and especially his protagonism in the constituent assembly, 
Azaña’s speech renders abundantly clear that the separation between Church and State enshrined in 
the Constitution was far from friendly.    
 
Azaña and his party were center-left Republicans.  Notably, their main partners in the constituent 
assembly, the socialists, were initially loath to waste much energy on this issue, considering it a 
petit-bourgeois deviation from the real issues of “authentic class conflict.”57  However, the socialists’ 
competition with the anarchist movement for the loyalty of the dispossessed caused them to adapt 
and to support their petit-bourgeois Republican allies’ anticlerical cause, so as not to appear soft on 
the clerics, whom the anarchists never ceased to vehemently condemn as bitter enemies whose final 
sacrifice was fast approaching, at the moment of impending revolution, when the reign of justice on 
earth (and thus the new secular political religion) was destined to commence.  
 
The enshrinement of an unfriendly separation of Church and State in the Republican Constitution did 
not solve the issue; instead, as we have suggested, it served as a catalyst for the further deepening 
of the “clerical-anticlerical” divide, effectively alienating “a sizable segment of Spanish society from 
the new democratic regime at the time of its birth.”58 
 
During the constituent debates surrounding religion, one devout politician, among the minority in 
the constituent assembly, even called the Constitution “an invitation to Civil War.”59  Perhaps more 
dramatically still, “[i]mmediately after the vote on Article 26,” the principle Catholic groups (the 
Agrarian, Basque, and Navarrese factions) all “stormed out of the chamber, accusing the Cortes of 
imposing a ‘violent and sectarian’ solution to the religious problem and thereby articulating a direct 
threat to the legitimacy of the new regime.”  A sentiment reproduced almost exactly by the founder 
of the CEDA, Gil Robles, who would insist in no uncertain terms: “[R]eligious Spaniards ‘cannot 
accept this draft of the Constitution, and we declare … that from the moment that a text of this kind 
is approved, we will proclaim the opening of a new constituent period.60   
 
 
The Tragic Denouement of the Conflict between the “Two Spains” 
 
The assent of liberal, secular, modern European Spain over reactionary, Catholic, backward was 
destined to be temporary, and a tragic denouement of the Republican experiment with democracy 
awaited.  Paul Preston makes the case persuasively – albeit with the benefit of historical hindsight – 
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that the anticlerical bent of the constituent assembly ultimately played right into the hands of the 
oligarchic enemies of the Republic.  In Preston’s words: 
 
“[T]he Republic’s anti-clerical legislation would provide an apparent justification for the virulent 
enmity of those who already had ample motive to see it destroyed.  The bilious rhetoric of the 
Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy was immediately pressed into service.  Moreover, the 
gratuitous nature of some anti-clerical measures would help recruit many ordinary Catholics to 




In the wake of the military uprising in July of 1936, which would soon explode into a long and bloody 
Civil War, in the very first hours there was unleashed across most of the country an intense and 
violent, spontaneous persecution of priests and nuns, along with destruction of property, and 
burning and looting of Churches and convents, complete with elaborate ritualistic performances 
featuring the profaning of Church symbols.  Such a phenomenon of spontaneous clericide was all too 
reminiscent of revolutionary Russia, and therefore all the more horrifying for the privileged and the 
devout, no doubt.  Apocalyptic images and imagery, the rumours of which would be rapidly and ably 
exploited and the sacrileges magnified further in both range and recurrence by the propaganda 
machines at the disposal of the insurrectionist reactionary camp.   
 
Even so, the propaganda machines didn’t have to invent atrocities.  In his excellent account of class 
culture and class conflict in Barcelona that includes the outset of the revolution, Chris Ealham 
provides a vivid description of the highly ritualistic and simultaneously spontaneous yet organized 
nature of the violent “creative destruction” that erupted in those fateful days in July.  According to 
Ealham: 
 
“Across almost all of Barcelona, the local revolutionary committees organised the initial 
offensive against the Church during the ‘jornadas de justicia humeantes’ (or ‘days of smoking 
justice’) … The destructive activity was centered principally around religious images and symbols 
used in mass.  Many bonfires were organized by anticlerical crowds right across from the 
Churches, and religious images, paintings, and furniture such as the pews were burned.  Even 
though some artistic treasures were destroyed, the profaning of murals and objects of art 
reflected the intense popular desire to eliminate what was perceived as the collective symbolism 
of an old, oppressive order.”
62
     
 
Ealham is quick to point out that there was in fact a concerted effort by revolutionary committees to 
save valuable works of art; indeed, much of this art would be subsequently displayed in exhibitions 
for the public to view in revolutionary Barcelona.  But be that as it may, the image of “smoking 
justice” all too easily played into and confirmed the very worst fears of the privileged and the 
devout.  The Bolshevik demons of “anti-Spain” had risen up, as long predicted.  What more proof 
was needed?  The only solution, a Crusade to purge the country of its demonic enemies.  And 
Crusade was the term that the reactionary camp explicitly invoked to legitimate its genocidal cause. 
 
The term genocide is hardly hyperbolic here.  Preston has documented in rigorous detail the extent 
of atrocities, even extermination, on both sides, but especially emphasises the long-denied, vastly 
asymmetric suffering of the adversaries and victims of the so-called Crusade, in his evocatively titled 
recent book, The Spanish Holocaust.63  
 
 
The Franco Regime and the Ideology of “National-Catholicism” 
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The pendulum was thus destined to swing back again, this time perhaps decisively.  The victorious 
Franco regime would reap ruthless vengeance against the sacrileges of the “anti-Spain,” and it would 
propagate and institutionalise a regime of “national-catholicism.”  In both “its pronouncements and 
its legislation, the regime often referred to its Catholic inspiration.”64  
 
The logic and justifications entailed in these references strangely mirrored the arguments of their 
vanquished, secularist foe, Azaña.  Such a “national-Catholic” inversion of Azaña’s diagnosis is 
evident, for example, in the words of Manuel García Morente, a known liberal who became a priest 
as a result of his experience in the Civil War.  According to García Morente’s “national-Catholic” line 
of reasoning, if Spain was great during the sixteenth and seventeenth Centuries, this was as a result 
of its fervent commitment to the Catholic Cause.  Therefore, if it wants to be great again, it needs to 
reaffirm that commitment.  Indeed, in García Morente’s view, “the link between Catholicism and 
Spain is essential and consubstantial with the national person.”  It would therefore be impossible to 
imagine a Spain without Catholicism.  To break from Catholicism would require nothing less than 
breaking with the “Hispanic substance” of Spain.  If such a break were to occur, “over the old 
ancestral home of the peninsula would live other men” – men who could not, “without abusing the 
term, be called Spaniards.”65     
 
Nor was national-Catholicism merely a matter of ideological justification; it was institutionalised in 
myriad ways, with concrete material effects.66  Needless to say, the Franco regime not only “re-
established the presence of religion in education,” but also “abolished divorce, authorized 
jurisdictions in marital cases to ecclesiastical courts, gave public funds to pay clerical salaries, and 
subsidized the reconstruction of churches and convents.”  In addition, the symbols of the Catholic 
religion again came to dominate public spaces.  Likewise, Church officials were present in positions 
of prominence in official government ceremonies, and the same was true vice versa.   In sum, the 
state was practically converted, in many areas, into “the secular arm of the Church;” in exchange, do 
ut des, the church “contributed to the legitimation of the regime.”67   
 
Nevertheless, over the course of its four decades in power, the regime would preside over massive 
transformations in the Spanish social structure, transformations that were consubstantial with the 
definitive integration of the Spanish political economy into the core of global capitalism, a journey 
from semi-periphery to core.  The revolutionary transformations in social relations that accompanied 
this journey, and the shifts in worldview that seem endogenous to the processes of urbanization and 
capitalist development in Europe, were striking and quick in a country that grew exponentially from 
the late fifties through the early seventies, which witnessed the birth of mass consumer society in 
Spain, and undoubtedly contributed to defusing the explosiveness of the clerical-anticlerical 
cleavage.   
The pace of change in the country between 1950 and 1975 should not be underestimated.  Indeed, it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the transformations that took place between 1950 and 
1975 in terms of social relations were so great that the Spain of 1950 was in most respects more like 
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the Spain of 1850 than the Spain of 1975.68  With this came an unprecedented degree of 
secularization of Spanish society, despite and even in no small part because of the desperate 
attempts of the Franquist authorities to impose their reactionary interpretation of Catholicism on 
the Spanish public.   
The position of the state remained strikingly constant in its zealous commitment to a reactionary 
interpretation of Catholicism throughout this period.  However, the Church itself, spurred on by the 
progressive opening of the Second Vatican Council, underwent its own process of complex 
transformation, a veritable examen de conciencia, represented emblematically in the decidedly 
liberalizing posture of Cardinal Tarancón, who in 1973 came out with a forceful defense of “the 
plurality of political options that could be derived from faith and commitment to justice.”69  In the 
same year, at a joint consultative meeting of bishops and priests, a majority voted in favour of a 
resolution that “challenged the interpretation of the Civil War as a crusade” that had been 
infamously defended during the war in a 1937 collective letter of Spanish bishops, for which an 
apology was offered along the following lines: “We humbly recognize and ask pardon for having 
failed at the proper time to be ministers of reconciliation in the midst of our people, divided by a war 
between brothers.”70  The Spanish Church’s interpretation of the war had thus shifted, from Crusade 
to fratricide.  It thus participated in the reconstruction of the terms of collective memory, position 
itself as an agent of reconciliation, a prominent voice in the articulation of a refrain that would 
emerge as hegemonic over the course of the transition – “never again.”  
 
Religion and Politics in the Transition to Democracy 
In large part as a result of such profound changes, and in striking contrast to the proclamation of the 
Second Republic in the thirties, by the seventies, the death of Franco and the transition to 
democracy were not experienced by the hierarchy and the clerics of the Spanish Church, much less 
the faithful, as a trauma.  Nor was the democratic opposition keen to pick a fight on the issue of the 
relations between Church and state.  Though Spanish society had experienced a deep secularization 
since the mid-fifties, the militant secularism of the republican period was not revived.  A fact 
attributable not only, but also, to the direct involvement in the democratic opposition of individuals 
and organizations associated with the Catholic Church.  
Spain’s transition to democracy was for a long time touted in the so-called literature on 
“transitology” as a model of successful elite-led, pacted transition to democracy, in no small 
measure thanks to the canonical interpretation of the process advanced by Juan Linz. In recent 
years, coinciding and certainly influenced by the profound disenchantment triggered by the ongoing 
economic crisis and response of austerity, this hegemonic narrative of the transition has come under 
considerable attack.  According to these revisionist, neo-Republican critics of the transition paradigm 
and the so-called Regime of 1978, the pacted nature of the transition has seriously damaged the 
quality of democracy in post-transition Spain.  The so-called “pact of forgetting” was once a source 
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of pride, seen as emblematic of a definitive overcoming of the Manichean vision of the “two Spains.”  
It is increasingly challenged, rendered as emblematic not of reconciliation, but of impunity of so 
many implicated in the crimes of the regime.  It is at the same time seen as symptomatic of a certain 
post-fascist and/or lingering national-Catholic mist continuing to cloud and distort the terms of 
collective consciousness in contemporary Spain.     
Regardless of the normative optic one espouses on the transition, it would seem undeniable that the 
crafters of the 1978 Constitution understood their primary mission to be to avoid what they 
conceived as the “mistakes” of the past.  The refrain of “never again” was certainly never far from 
their minds.  Indeed, it conditioned decisively a willingness to compromise on virtually all sides.  One 
of the historical “lessons” repeatedly invoked by Constitutional lawyers and political activists on 
nearly all sides was the need for consensus, the need to avoid a partisan constitution such as the 
Republican one at all costs.  This time around, all sides consciously shied away from fanning those 
old sectarian flames.71 
The result in term of Constitutional provisions for the relations between Church and state can be 
considered one of friendly separation.  Like the Constitution of 1931, the Constitution of 1978 
establishes a formal separation of Church and state.  Article 16.3 explicitly establishes that “[t]here 
shall be no state religion.”  Even so, as Linz has insisted, “the specific norms and above all the spirit 
with which this principle was introduced are fundamentally different.”72  This different spirit, a spirit 
of compromise, is clearly conveyed in the very next sentence of Article 16.3, which goes on to 
declare in terms that would have infuriated Azaña: “The public authorities shall take the religious 
beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall maintain the consequent relations of cooperation 
with the Catholic Church and other confessions.” 
Not that this compromise clause was supported unanimously.  Tellingly, the socialists would vote 
against it in the congressional committee, leaving it up to the communists to tip the balance in 
favour of compromise.73  Nor would the Church remain entirely on the sidelines as a passive 
spectator throughout the constituent debates.  Instead, as Bonime Blanc documents in her 
meticulous monograph of the Constitution-making process, the Church maintained certain privileges 
and prerogatives, foremost among them, the prerogative to be consulted on problematic “issues of 
morality traditionally within its ‘jurisdiction’.”  These issues included, more specifically, “[c]lauses on 
freedom of religion, education, divorce and abortion were debated at length and were complicated 
by the extra-parliamentary involvement of the Catholic Church;” as well as a host of other “moral” 
topics as diverse as “whether or not to constitutionalize the death penalty, the granting of trade 
union freedoms and the protection of the individual against arbitrary state power.”74 
As was the case during the Second Republic, education was perhaps the most complex of these 
issues, since “it involved…decisions on both the overall role of the Catholic Church and of the state in 
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subsidizing and expanding public education.”  Moreover, as noted above, the constitution-makers 
were “well aware of the emotional and socio-political implications of the subject,” and perhaps 
especially of the nefarious consequences of the precedent of anticlerical provisions in the 
Republican Constitution.  The result was again an ambiguous formulation that nevertheless ensured 
that a significant “degree of Church involvement would remain.”  Moreover, it was agreed that even 
in public schools, “religious instruction would remain an important subject.”75 
With regards to other issues within the Church’s “traditional jurisdiction,” the Constitution-makers 
chose not to answer potentially divisive questions about abortion and divorce in their founding 
document, preferring to leave it up to majorities in the legislature to decide.76 
Overall, as Bonime-Blanc concludes, “[t]he political-ideological behaviour of the Constitution-makers 
on the issue of church-state relations was as pragmatic as could have been expected.”77  Which is 
not to say that significant partisan differences could not be detected.  In fact, there were points of 
disgruntlement on both flanks.  Whereas the PSOE “remained dissatisfied with Article 16,” on the 
grounds that it implied a “subtle confessionality of the state,” the Post-franquist Alianza Popular 
were concerned that the solutions reached on education failed to guarantee in sufficiently 
unambiguous terms a significant enough degree of continued Church involvement.  Despite such 
observable differences, thanks in large part to the conciliatory posture of the communists, the 
hegemonic middle-ground of consensus generally held firm.78          
 
Religion and Politics in Post-Transition Spain 
What has been the nature of Church-state relations in post-transition Spain? Without a doubt, they 
have remained much friendlier than during the Republican period.  As Linz observed in the early 
nineties, though “the Church as an institution and a large number of practising Catholics have not 
completely rejected the past regime,” precious few truly “desire a return of national-Catholicism.”  
The Church has certainly registered its discontent with laws like divorce and even managed to 
successively block more than a limited legalization of abortion, though it never openly advocated 
their revision, at least until this past year, when the Church hierarchy and some lay activists were 
involved in an albeit failed attempt by the conservative government to introduce more restrictive 
limits on reproductive rights.79  In a similar vein, more conservative members of the Church 
hierarchy were quite vocal in their opposition to the legislation on gay marriage before it was passed 
in 2005 by the Zapatero government; however, they have not been successful or for that matter 
even vocal in advocating its revision since.80 
By far the most conflictual issues in the post-transition period have surrounded the subject of 
national unity, not the matter of relations between church and state.  Because regional-nationalist 
movements themselves enjoy tight relations with the Catholic Church, the salience of the national 
question has not worked to revive the intensity of the old-clerical-anticlerical divide.  Recent periods 
of PP electoral hegemony, in combination with the diffusion of conservative radio talk shows on 
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Church-sponsored channels, have nevertheless no doubt led to more pronounced partisan divisions 
between practicing Catholics and believers versus non-practicers and nonbelievers, certainly more 
salient than in the not-too-distant past.  But a repetition of Republican-era levels of polarization 
along this axes seems extremely unlikely, indeed even less likely than along the axis of class.  Only 
the issue of the unity of the nation these days seems capable of still mobilizing and polarizing 
masses, and on that issue devout Catholics from different parts of the country profoundly disagree.   
The past two decades in particular have witnessed a demographic transformation, an 
unprecedented onset of international migration that includes significant numbers of Muslims from 
Morocco, a country with whom Spain has a deep and conflictual colonial past.81  Which raises a 
whole host of very old and simultaneously very new questions for the relations between Church and 
state in Spain.  The space of Al Andalus in the collective memory and imagination of a global Islamic 
community demonized and increasingly politicized in reaction to the ongoing Orwellian War on 
Terror, in which the Spanish authorities and successive governments have been complicit, on the 
one side, combined with anti-Islamic perceptual schema with deep historical roots in the Spanish 
past, on the other, makes for a potentially explosive conflict, to say the least.  One that has exploded 
once already – in Atocha, in 2004.   
Though xenophobic and Islamophobic backlash have thus far remain muffled.  Tellingly, the 
conservative party attempted to manipulate the bombing for its electoral advantage by blaming it 
on ETA; but as it became clear that the culprits were alienated Moroccan migrants inspired by Al 
Qaeda, the electoral dynamic unleashed was one that did not cut in a reactionary direction; to the 
contrary, it rendered accountable the conservative party for Aznar’s highly unpopular decision to 
participate in the criminal invasion of Iraq, helping to catapult Zapatero’s socialists into office for two 
terms.82  The  PP would not return to power until 2010, after the outbreak of the economic crisis and 
the onset of a bipartisan-sanctioned austerity regime, which has entailed painful cuts to social rights 
that have in turn provoked a great deal of damage to all the established parties in Spain’s party 
system.   
Thus far, however, no significant xenophobic, right-populist parties have surfaced.  What’s more, the 
PP has even refrained for the most part from playing the demagogic, Islamophobic card.  But the 
potential is there, especially if we are to judge by the diffusion across the country of neighbourhood 
campaigns against the opening of mosques.83  Here the ambiguous formulation of Article 16.3 may 
yet come in handy in ways perhaps unimagined by the drafters of the Constitution – since the 
mandate “to take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account” and to “maintain consequent 
relations of cooperation with the Church and other confessions” should obviously extend to and 
                                                          
81
 See Francisco Diez de Velasco, Religiones en España: Historia y Presente (Madrid: Akal, 2012); Francisco Diez 
de Velasco, “The Visibilization of Religious Minorities in Spain,” Social Compass 57(2), 2010: p.235-252; Héctor 
Cebolla Boada and Amparo González Ferrer, La inmigración en España (2000-2007) (Madrid: Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008); and Ana I. Planet Contreras and Jordi Moreras, Islam e inmigración 
(Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008).  For treatments of religious diversity in Spain in 




 See Robert Fishman, “On the Continuing Relevance of the Weberian Methodological Perspective (With 
Applications to the Spanish Case of Elections in the Aftermath of Terrorism)” Kellogg Institute Working Paper 
#317 (February 2005) https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/317.pdf; and Ignacio Lago and 
José Ramón Montero, “The 2004 Election in Spain: terrorism, Accountability, and Voting,” ICPS Working Paper 
#253 (2006) http://www.icps.cat/archivos/Workingpapers/wp253.pdf?noga=1.  
83
 Avi Astor, “Memory, Community, and Opposition to Mosques: the Case of Badalona,” Theory and Society, 
Vol. 41, Issue 4, July 2012, pp.325-349. 
22 
 
therefore provide a Constitutional basis for guaranteeing constitutional recognition, respect, and 
protection for Spain’s minority Islamic community from the tyranny of a Catholic-cum-secular 
majority.     
 
Conclusion 
The trajectory of Spain as traced in this article has been characterized by pendular swings in 
ideological struggles amongst and against different institutionalized configurations relating Church 
and State.  Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the country witnessed a 
process of polarization between a right committed to the re-trenchment and propagation of a 
politicized, reactionary and authoritarian brand of Catholicism, on the one side, and a militant 
secularist center-left and revolutionary left, on the other.  This ideological struggle constituted a 
major social cleavage that pit advocates of politicized religion against advocates of militant 
secularism, and worked to inhibit the construction of the “twin tolerations” between secular and 
religious institutions and authorities required for democratic stability.   
State policies did not only reflect but also served to exacerbate ideological divides over religion.  In 
the democratic experiment of the Second Republic, constitution-makers played a nefarious role in 
this regard, by pursuing and enshrining a partisan secularizing agenda into the constitutional order.  
Indeed, as Alfred Stepan has argued, the separation of Church and State entrenched in the 1931 
constitution ranks alongside that of the 1905 French Constitution as one of the two most “hostile” 
such separations in the history of Western Europe.84  Such hostile separation contributed directly to 
political polarization, the breakdown of democracy, and the tragic denouement of Civil War.  
The unfriendly separation of Church and State institutionalized by the republican regime would be 
succeeded by a subsequent pendular swing in the direction of politicized religion, which would be 
institutionalised by the much longer-lasting Franquist project of “National-Catholicism.”      
Only after the death of Franco and the transition to democracy would the “twin tolerations” finally 
triumph.  In the post-transition constitutional order, a relation of “positive accommodation” of 
Catholicism alongside a friendly separation between Church and State would be institutionalized. 
The Spanish case thus highlights both the difficulty and the importance of the task of constructing 
the “twin tolerations,” while demonstrating decisively that such difficulties are not exclusive to the 
non-Western world.  The main protagonists and high dramas of Spanish politics up until quite 
recently were characterized instead by a “twin intolerance.”  Tolerance was long stifled on both 
sides of Spain’s clerical-anticlerical divide, the extreme flanks of which successfully fed off one 
another.  Toleration was effectively drowned out, swept away in ever-expanding waves of 
polarization between clerical and anticlerical forces.     
By now, however, the “twin tolerations” are firmly entrenched. Even so, as is happening across 
much of the rest of Europe, old debates about religion and secularism are taking on renewed 
salience in Spain.  These old issues are become increasingly interwoven with “new questions about 
the scope and limits of a multicultural and multi-ethnic society,” especially with respect to the recent 
growth of Spain’s Muslim minority community. 85  Spain’s current constitutional order provides 
potential resources for accommodating the new yet very old challenge posed by the presence of 
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Islam in Spain.  However, perceptual schema and deep prejudices inherited from the past and 
propagated in the present against the backdrop of the global “war on terror” continue to work to 
effectively exclude Muslims from incorporation into the horizons of imagined belonging to the 
Spanish body politic.   
 
 
  
 
 
